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Courtney J. Restemayer*

I.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE APPROACH AND CURRENT APPROACH TO THE
ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARIES TO INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS

Through

various modern forms of entertainment, print, and comedy the stereotype of
“the secretary” often involves a hard-nosed, secretly beautiful, will-sleep-with-the-boss woman
who simply carries out the commands of those above her in automated, non-opinionated fashion.
Under a similar set of duties, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “secretary” as “An administrative
assistant … in charge of official correspondence, minutes of board meetings, and records of stock
ownership and transfer.” 1 Mechanical, tedious, but fundamentally important to the success of the
business is the work of the enigmatic secretary. International arbitration tribunals, similar to most
businesses, are subject to paperwork, documentation, and organization, to name a few of the tasks
involved in the mechanical structure. The ability to effectively and efficiently carry out these
tasks makes alternative dispute resolution desirable to clients, arbitrators, and institutions. But, as
in any modern office plot, what if the secretary went outside her stereotypical role, authorized or
not? Does her involvement create a violation of the sanctity not of her bosses affairs, but of the
fundamental nature of arbitrations? The role of the administrative secretary to international
arbitration tribunals remains ambiguous, varied, and often secretive to clients, creating wide
controversy in the field today 2 comparable to a wife’s suspicion of her husband’s secretary.

A. Administration – Theoretical Role of “Secretaries”
It is important to remember, though arbitration is an alternative means of adjudication, it
also is a profit making enterprise. Typical to most business enterprises, the theoretical role of
tribunal secretaries is to assist the arbitral tribunal and facilitate complex or large arbitrations in
purely an administrative function3. This function, however, is not the source of critic’s “wife
1

B LACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
See U.N. COMMISSION ON TRADE LAW (“UNCITRAL”) Y EARBOOK, VOL. XXVII (1996), pt. 2 (“Views or
expectations may differ especially where a task of the secretary is similar to professional functions of the arbitrators.
Such a role of the secretary is in the view of some commentators inappropriate or is appropriate only under certain
conditions, such as that the parties agree thereto”).
3
See ICC NOTE ¶ 3 (limits secretary function to administrative tasks); see also UNCITRAL Notes ¶ 24-27 (lists
the types of administrative services that are allowed to aid the tribunal: providing meeting rooms and coordinating
secretarial services); NCCCP, ARGENTINA, ART. 749 (tribunal secretary must attend all meetings and hearings
between arbitrators and parties and/or their lawyers); see also A. Redfern and M. Hunter, LAW AND P RACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (3rd ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 1999), at ¶ 4-101 (“it is an established
practice in large and complex international commercial arbitrations for the arbitral tribunal to appoint and
administrative secretary or registrar to take charge of all administrative arrangements (which) would otherwise fall to
be made by the arbitral tribunal and to act as a link between the parties an the arbitral tribunal.”).
2
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anxiety.” Some assume secretaries can perform professional services that parallel clerical tasks
comparable to those of law clerks 4: legal research, brief and memorandum composition, and basic
document review. 5 These roles have raised certain documented debate, but all sides agree the
scope of professional tasks must be limited. 6 Several such instances, for example, involve
analysis not only of jurisdictional law, but also of party submissions. 7 This practice, still, is more
rare than the current movement or perhaps current discovery, that secretaries are now sitting in on
deliberations 8 and drafting the awards for the tribunal. 9 One arbitrator in attendance at the most
recent Global Arbitration Review (GAR) conference in London stated, “if the role of the facts and
the party arguments are drafted incorrectly, it leads to confusion, misunderstanding, and
misstating the arbitral award.” 10 With such importance resting on the pen of the secretary, why
has this practice evolved and thrived? The prominence grew, simply, through necessity to the
future of arbitration.
Two fundamental principles in alternative dispute resolution, and more specifically
arbitration, are the cost efficiency and speed of this form of adjudication as opposed to trial.11 The
basic idea is that the risks or issues surrounding administrative secretaries in arbitrations are
vastly overshadowed by the benefits: (1) organization of procedure, (2) keeping records, (3)
expediting deliberations, etc. Often business choose arbitration because they do not want to strain
their relationships with adversarial trials as well as for speed and lower costs. 12 Arbitrations are
currently getting more and more expensive as new rules or exceptions are implemented through
jurisdictional laws or party contracts. While the average costs of arbitration does not surpass costs
of trial, some large-scale arbitrations threaten while others overcome the economic division.
Arbitral practitioners and arbitral institutes need more than the old reputation of arbitration
proceedings as “quick and cheap” and needs to implement cost effective methods to its procedure
to continue its prevalence in modern business and law13: enter the impregnable secretary.

4

See generally Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Committee on
Arbitration of the New York City Bar Association, Secretaries to International Arbitral Tribunals, 17 AM . REV. INT’ L
ARB. 575, 576 (2006).
5
UNICTRAL NOTE ¶ 27.
6
See E. Schwartz, The Rights and Duties of ICC Arbitrators’ in The Status of the Arbitrator, ICC Bull. Special
Suppl. 67, 86 (P. Fouchard ed., 1995) (professional tasks are often implemented but under the direction and limitation
of the tribunal); see ENGLISH ARBITRATION ACT § 24(1) (1996) (allows secretaries to draft facts but prohibits
extension to procedural orders or parts of the award); ICC NOTE ¶ 3 (“administrative secretary must not assume the
functions of an arbitrator…by becoming involved in the decision-making process…or expressing opinions or
conclusions.”).
7
See generally Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Committee on
Arbitration of the New York City Bar Association, Secretaries to International Arbitral Tribunals, 17 AM . REV. INT’ L
ARB. 575, 576 (2006).
8
See, e.g., A Guide to the NAI Arbitration Rules 224 (Bommel van der Bend, Marnix Leijten and Marc
Ynzonides eds., Kluwer Law International 2009); see also H J Snijders, Nederlands Arbitragerecht, Kluwer 2007, p
274.
9
See Constantine Partasides, The Fourth Arbitrator? The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International
Arbitration, 18 ARB INT’ L 147, 152 (2002).
10
Kyriaki Karadelis, The Role of the Tribunal Secretary, GLOBAL ARBITRATION R EVIEW (Dec. 21 2011),
www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30051/the-role-tribunal-secretary/.
11
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, C ASES AND M ATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND P RACTICE (5th ed. 2009).
12
Id.
13
Id.
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1.

Organization and Procedure

“Time is of the essence” and “time is money” are the simple, yet appropriate, reasoning
establishing speed as one of the fundamental principles of arbitration. Scheduling often becomes
a balancing act between promoting party equality and time pressures: dates need to be set,
paperwork filed for proceedings and arbitrators, and venues booked. Arbitration institutions often
take care of these elements, 14 but ad hoc arbitration lacks the formalities.15

2.

Records

Records in arbitration proceedings may take many different forms. First, if the call to
arbitration is not through submission – the process where parties willing agree to submit a current
dispute to arbitration – the contract containing the arbitral clause becomes the first document to
obtain. Appointed or employed secretaries will find the scope, the choice of law, the jurisdiction,
and other party bargained matters within that clause. 16
Second, even if the scope is broad or ambiguous, parties may mutually chose at the start
to submit only certain issues to arbitration. The “issues” therefore, need to be documented and
implemented to create barriers of consideration. Making note of these key elements helps
eliminate challenges to the award de facto. 17 Under this same premise, where secretaries are
permitted to employ “professional tasks” 18 they will obtain relevant subject-matter and
jurisdictional law. 19 In light of recent technological advances, secretaries familiar and proficient
in IT skills greatly aid the tribunal with preparation. 20
Third, a record of the parties’ stances or arguments is essential for arbitrators when
rendering a decision. Without documentation of facts or arguments, the reasoning for an award is
weakened by calls of arbitrator partiality or corruption 21. While courts often find this argument
without merit 22, challenges slow down the arbitral process for clients. Recently, Netherlands
Supreme Court ruled that, absent previous party provisions, a record is not mandatory and
tribunal secretary notes are not subject to disclosure:

14

UNICTRAL N OTES ON ORGANIZING ARBITRAL P ROCEEDINGS, UNCITRAL YEARBOOK XXVII (1996) Art.
4 ¶ 26 (“Some arbitral institutions routinely assign such persons to cases administered by them”).
15
Id. (“In arbitrations not administered by an institution or where the arbitral institution does not appoint a
secretary, some arbitrators frequently engage such persons, at least in certain types of cases, whereas many others
normally conduct the proceedings without them.”).
16
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, C ASES AND M ATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND P RACTICE (5th ed. 2009).
17
Id.
18
UNICTRAL NOTES ON ORGANIZING ARBITRAL P ROCEEDINGS, UNCITRAL Y EARBOOK XXVII, ART. 4
(1996).
19
Id.
20
ARB. HK P GUIDE 8.18 § 8-81, 82 (“In heavy document cases, this is particularly useful because the secretary
can provide considerable assistance with regard to the collation of the documents and save the time of the tribunal in
finding documents at any stage of the proceedings… In recent times where cases are prepared with a high technological
content, the secretary usually has better IT skills than the tribunal and this again provides useful assistance to the
tribunal.”).
21
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, C ASES AND M ATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND P RACTICE (5th ed. 2009).
22
See Eelco Meerdink, Supreme Court Rules Arbitral Tribunal Not Required to Disclose Hearing Notes, 15 NO.
1 IBA ARB. NEWS 131 reviewing, Knowsley SK Ltd. v. AGJ Van Wassenaer van Catwijck, Amsterdam Court of
Appeal (Dec. 2 2008), LJN BG9050, case no 200.010.430/01 SKG, NJF 2009, 39.
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In addition to party autonomy, another policy argument can be raised
against the disclosure of the informal notes of the tribunal's secretary,
namely the imprecise and potentially inaccurate nature of the notes.
Contrary to a formal report prepared by the arbitrators, informal notes
taken by a secretary do not necessarily reflect an accurate and complete
account of the hearing. Indeed, such notes may very well contain a
biased description or an incomplete account of the debate because they
were not prepared for the purpose of providing a faithful report. If
(informal) notes of a tribunal's secretary had to be disclosed upon the
request of a party, arbitrators would have to make sure that these notes
contain a correct account of the hearing (and nothing more). 23

In cases where arbitrators did not take notes, or their notes are lacking, they can rely on
the notes of tribunal secretaries in a limited capacity to fill gaps; consequently, this practice
promotes the accuracy of arbitral awards.
Lastly, whether or not the secretary herself drafts the arbitral award, both the secretary’s
personal notes and the award become a record compiled primarily by institutions for their
personal record keeping:
Irrespective of the issue of party autonomy, the issue arises whether the
preparation of a transcript or minutes--and their communication to the
parties--should be encouraged. We think it should. At a minimum, a
basic report giving a factual account of the main substantive arguments
and procedural discussions and decisions should be made for each
arbitration hearing. 24

Therefore, allowing a secretary access to relevant documents and keep records promotes
time and cost efficiency and allows Institutions to keep detailed business records.

3.

Expediting Deliberations

Some arbitral institutions outline the time frame for arbitrations in their governing
standards or rules. 25 This is one way the arbitral community maintains the speed of its
adjudication. Deliberations, however, with or without this constraint can take long periods of time
meanwhile businesses stall operation in expectancy of the award. Similar to the role of easing the
compilation of a record collected during proceedings, secretaries may also aid the deliberation
phase of arbitration through drafting the award. Oftentimes, this also saves the parties money
because the hourly rate of a tribunal secretary is lower than the arbitrator. 26
23

Id.
See Eelco Meerdink, Supreme Court Rules Arbitral Tribunal Not Required to Disclose Hearing Notes, 15 NO.
1 IBA ARB. NEWS 131 reviewing, Knowsley SK Ltd. v. AGJ Van Wassenaer van Catwijck, Amsterdam Court of
Appeal (Dec. 2 2008), LJN BG9050, case no 200.010.430/01 SKG, NJF 2009, 39.
25
See generally ICC NOTE, ART. 24 (“The time limit within which the Arbitral Tribunal must render its final
Award is six months. Such time limit shall start to run from the date of the last signature by the Arbitral Tribunal or of
the parties of the Terms of Reference, or, in the case of application of Article 18(3), the date of the notification to the
Arbitral Tribunal by the Secretariat of the approval of the Terms of Reference by the Court.”).
26
Kyriaki Karadelis, The Role of the Tribunal Secretary, GLOBAL ARBITRATION R EVIEW (Dec. 21 2011),
www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30051/the-role-tribunal-secretary/.
24
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4.

Issue with Duplicity

While the scope of the secretary authority is the forefront of critic concerns, critics also
maintain that requiring or authorizing secretaries in arbitral proceedings does not always keep
costs lower. In fact, one critic at the recent GAR conference stated he believed secretaries were
duplicitous and just cost clients more money when parties request secretarial services: many
arbitrators have what he called “back-up” in their office or chambers that deal with the
administrative elements of the proceedings. 27 Therefore, when parties acquiesce to secretary
involvement, they are paying for the same services arbitrators are already using but less formally.
Further, the Secretary-General in ICSID arbitrations often will assign a secretary to arbitral
proceedings 28; additionally, often tribunals will add secretaries to assist them directly. 29

B.

Appointment and Procedure

Cinematically, it is not until after the secretary is hired that the wife wishes she had taken
part in the hiring process. While no overarching policy guides the appointment of tribunal
secretaries, and its subsequent procedure, many commentators believe consent 30 to be the
cornerstone for use in the future; a premise, wary wives would adamantly support.

1.

Institutional Rules

Institutions run the gambit of restricting secretary use to a more laissez faire method. This
section summarizes the major Arbitral Institution’s regulations on tribunal secretaries in current
use.

a.

AAA

Current American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules are silent on
tribunal secretaries. Instead, the only direction this Institution provides comes from the Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes: Canon V and Canon VI. 31 Appointment is left to
the discretion of arbitrators, subject to informing parties but not requiring consent 32; still, the
requirement to inform the parties remains unenforceable without a definition of who qualifies as a
27

Kyriaki Karadelis, The Role of the Tribunal Secretary, GLOBAL ARBITRATION R EVIEW (Dec. 21 2011),
www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30051/the-role-tribunal-secretary/.
28
See ICSID ADMINISTRATIVE AND F INANCIAL R EGULATIONS, REG. 25 (2005), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partC-chap05.htm#r25; see also, Antonio R. Parra, The Role of the ICSID
Secretariat in the Administration of Arbitration Proceedings under the ICSID Convention, 13 F OREIGN INVESTMENT
L.J. 85 (1998).
29
Id.
30
See Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Committee on Arbitration of the
New York City Bar Association, Secretaries to International Arbitral Tribunals, 17 AM . REV. INT’ L ARB. 575, 576
(2006).
31
AAA CODE OF E THICS F OR ARBITRATORS IN C OMMERCIAL D ISPUTES, C ANONS V, VI (2004), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?32124.
32
AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Canon VI § B (2004), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?32124.
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“secretary”. Canon IV suggests that any help in connection with reaching a decision could
arguably be considered the “secretary” definition:
The arbitrator should keep confidential all matters relating to the
arbitration proceedings and decision. An arbitrator may obtain help
from an associate, a research assistant or other persons in connection
with reaching his or her decision if the arbitrator informs the parties of
the use of such assistance and such persons agree to be bound by the
provisions of this Canon. 33

The Code of Ethics, however, lacks any other information defining “secretary” which
lends itself to creating a loophole to disclosure. Because “back-up” falling within Canon IV,
Section B is bound to the same “oath” of “Canon VI: An Arbitrator Should Be Faithful To The
Relationship Of Trust And Confidentiality Inherent In That Office” 34 any loopholes could cause
serious distrust in the confidentiality of disclosed information. Similarly, Canon V, Sections B
and C, “An arbitrator should decide all matters justly, exercising independent judgment, and
should not permit outside pressure to affect the decision…An arbitrator should not delegate the
duty to decide to any other person” 35seem to contradict Canon VI 36 and result in lack of
enforcement or effectiveness.

b.

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

The United Nations Commission on the International Trade Law published its current,
nonbinding guides to secretary roles in its 1996 Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings
(“UNICTRAL Notes”) 37:
Finalized by UNCITRAL in 1996, the Notes are designed to assist
arbitration practitioners by providing an annotated list of matters on
which an arbitral tribunal may wish to formulate decisions during the
course of arbitral proceedings, including deciding on a set of arbitration
rules, the language and place of an arbitration and questions relating to
confidentiality, as well as other matters such as conduct of hearings and
the taking of evidence and possible requirements for the filing or
delivering of an award. The text may be used in both ad hoc and
institutional arbitrations. 38

Section 4 (Articles 24-27) 39 addressing “administrative services that may be needed for
the arbitral tribunal to carry out its functions” lays out four guiding provisions for assistance.
Essentially, it attempts to establish the limited role as purely organizational – but it’s not that

33

Id.
AAA, supra note 32, Canon VI.
35
AA, supra note 32, Canon V §§ (B), (C).
36
AAA, supra note 32, Canons V, VI.
37
UNICTRAL Notes (1996), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1996Notes_proceedings.html.
38
Id.
39
Id.
34
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simple. 40 The UNICTRAL Note’s lack of definitions lends to a more controversial usage, termed
“professional assistance”, meaning legal research. 41 Critics worry by controlling the secondary
knowledge of the arbitrator, the secretary can effectively sway the award with principal driven
agenda. Those favoring the professional assistance approach argue this knit picking is highly
unnecessary and slows down the progress of adapting arbitration practices to changing global
needs. 42 In other forms of adjudication this process is a cornerstone of legal practice: judicial
clerks and staff supplying judges with case decisions, briefs, and memorandums. 43 Beyond
actually finding these resources, secretaries often summarize materials. Like Canon VI’s
broadening of Canon V in the AAA Code of Ethics, Section 17, Articles 82 and 83 broaden the
provisions under Section 4: Article 82 allows arbitrators to appoint a secretary to prepare the
record of hearings without party consent 44 and Article 83 expands to transcripts taken of hearing
recordings. 45 Proponents argue the experience young lawyers gain from fulfilling the role of
arbitral secretary, comparable to a judicial clerk, is necessary to developing the arbitrational skills
of future generations. 46

c.

ICSID’s Regulation 25

The Secretary-General appoints the secretary in ICSID arbitrations, who, then, must
adhere to these guidelines laid out in Regulation 25 of the ICSID Administrative and Financial
Regulations:
(a) represent the Secretary-General and may perform all functions assigned to
the [Secretary-General] by these Regulations or the Rules with regard to
individual proceedings or assigned to the [Secretary-General] by the
Convention, and delegated by him to the Secretary;

(b) be the channel through which the parties may request particular services from the
Centre;
(c) keep summary minutes of hearings, unless the parties agree with the Commission,
Tribunal or Committee on another manner of keeping the record of the hearings; and

40

Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Committee on Arbitration of the
New York City Bar Association, Secretaries to International Arbitral Tribunals, 17 AM . REV. INT’ L ARB. 575, 579
(2006).
41
See Partasides The Fourth Arbitrator? The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International Arbitration (2002)
18(2) ARB. INT’ L 147, 149 (asserts that the secretary’s function vary from purely administrative to decision-making
depending on the arbitrator); see also, UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings ¶ 26-17 (1996), available
at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/English/texts/arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-e.pdf.
42
See C.H. Schreuer, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001) (asserts secretaries are usually legal
staff).
43
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, C ASES AND M ATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND P RACTICE (5th ed. 2009).
44
AAA Rules, Art. 82.
45
AAA Rules, Art. 83.
46
C.H. Schreuer, THE ICSID C ONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1210 n. 18 (Cambridge UP, 2001) (tribunal
secretaries are usually part of legal staff).
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(d) perform other functions with respect to the proceedings at the request of the President
of the Commission, Tribunals or Committee, or at the direction of the SecretaryGeneral. 47
At first glance, this Regulation intends to address several ambiguities in the role of the
secretary. It lists the duties, how a secretary is appointed, who appoints, and her approachability
with parties. Part (d) still remains troubling: “other functions” and “respect to the proceedings”
erase the formal enumerated role of the secretary and once again opens the function to
interpretation where the end justifies the means.

II. C U R R E N T L E G I S L A T I O N A T T E M P T I N G

TO

REGULATE LOOPHOLES AND

AMBIGUITIES

A. ICC Court of Arbitration

1.

Past Loose Guidelines

Though the ICC’s Rules of Arbitration lack direction on tribunal secretaries, in 1995,
their appointment became subject to the Note from the Secretariat of the ICC Court Concerning
the Appointment of Administrative Secretaries by Arbitral Tribunals (hereafter the “Note”):
The ICC provides this Note to parties and arbitrators at the outset of
arbitral proceedings. The Note states that the tribunal may appoint a
secretary, but only upon the consent of all parties, and only after
informing the parties of the secretary’s identity and the duties he or she
will perform. 48

Further, the Note limits those duties to administrative tasks in order to avoid any
influence on the deliberation. The Notes critics argue it challenges party autonomy by allowing
the arbitrator this outside power and through limiting the role of the secretary, which they believe
should be left to the parties to decide. 49
One major flaw in the ICC’s attempt to regulate arbitral secretaries is the Note only
outlines specific instances where the secretary cannot act 50; yet, stating prohibitions and
limitations rather than defining power and role perpetuate the current ambiguities. The limitations
themselves contain vague language including “decision-making process” 51, inviting interpretation
47

See ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations, Reg. 25 (2005), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partC-chap05.htm#r25; see also, Antonio R. Parra, The Role of the ICSID
Secretariat in the Administration of Arbitration Proceedings under the ICSID Convention, 13 F OREIGN INVESTMENT
L.J. 85 (1998).
48
Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Committee on Arbitration of the
New York City Bar Association, Secretaries to International Arbitral Tribunals, 17 AM . REV. INT’ L ARB. 575, 577
(2006).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
ICC NOTE.
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of what actions occur before the decision-making process begins, which overlap, and does that
mean the secretaries duties are at an end or can it overlap without being involved in the opinion
aspect of the process?
It is clear, however, that the ICC recognized the need for some regulation to guide future
arbitrations. Their first attempt, while ultimately failing to address the continuing concerns of the
ADR community, shows that these issues are not on the backburner but don’t have a ready
solution without more regulation: critics believe the ICC is taking away party autonomy. 52
Currently, the ICC is devising an actual set of guidelines concerning secretaries.53

2.

Devising New Guidelines

In 2012, the ICC printed a revamped set of rules, taking effect January 1st. While the
rumored new guidelines containing suggested clauses for tribunal secretaries has yet to be
published the new rules included this provision in Article 15, Section 1:
The proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal shall be governed by
these Rules, and, where these Rules are silent, by any rules which the
parties or, failing them, the Arbitral Tribunal may settle on, whether or
not reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law
to be applied to the arbitration. 54

The composition of the court changes slightly from “tribunal secretary” to a
Secretariat, an ICC employee whom the Secretary-General appoints case-by-case. Article 2,
Sections 2-5 outlines the standards for procedure:
2. The Court shall not appoint Vice-Chairmen or members of the Court
as arbitrators. They may, however, be proposed for such duties by one
or more of the parties, or, pursuant to any other procedure agreed upon
by the parties, subject to confirmation.
3. When the Chairman, a Vice-Chairman or a member of the Court or
of the Secretariat is involved in any capacity whatsoever in proceedings
pending before the Court, such person must inform the Secretary
General of the Court upon becoming aware of such involvement.
4. Such person must refrain from participating in the discussions or in
the decisions of the Court concerning the proceedings and must be
absent from the courtroom whenever the matter is considered.
5. Such person will not receive any material documentation or
information pertaining to such proceedings. 55

52

See Pierre Lalive, Un Post-Scriptum et Quelques Citations, ASA Bull. 1, 35-43 (1996).
Kyriaki Karadelis, The Role of the Tribunal Secretary, GLOBAL Arbitration REVIEW, 21 Dec 2011, available
at www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30051/the-role-tribunal-secretary; see also, Constantine Partasides,
The Fourth Arbitrator? The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT’ L 147, 152
(2002).
54
ICC RULES, ART. 15(1) (2012).
55
ICC RULES, ART. 2 (2012).
53
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III. W H E R E S U S P I C I O N S A R I S E

INEVITABLY SUCCUMB TO THE
TYRANNICAL INTERPRETATION OF LAWYERS
AND

A. In One Corner - Confidentiality
Confidentiality, the ability for parties not to air their dirty laundry, is another fundamental
principal in arbitration. One of the few countries to implement new laws regulating
confidentially, Peru’s statue stipulates:
Unless otherwise agreed, all participants in the arbitration (arbitrators,
secretaries, arbitration institution, witnesses, experts, the party
representatives and legal counsel) are to keep the arbitration
proceedings and the award confidential…That said, the confidential
nature of the notes taken by the secretary does not necessarily follow
from the confidentiality of deliberations in chambers. 56

While certain players are necessary to the process, the tribunal secretary might not
qualify. In fact, arbitrators cannot disclose any part or the arbitration. If secretaries are used, does
the confidentiality protection vanish? What if the role of the secretary is to keep a record of the
proceedings or attend and transcribe deliberations? These questions push for more limited access
for secretaries in order to preserve confidentiality. Still, which is more desirable, limiting access
or allowing someone who was “never in the room” to have such a fundamental impact on the
outcome?

B.

In the Other Corner – Party Autonomy and the Level of Direct Communication
with Arbitrators

1.

Husband’s Hiring Secretaries without Wives’ Input: Arbitrators
Preempting Party Autonomy

Parties have the right to select at least one arbitrator57, given certain guidelines. This right
to select arbitrators, however, is directly undermined when those arbitrators either do not disclose
their employment of “back-ups” 58 or even under transparency the arbitrators or regulating
institution chooses the secretaries 59. Given the unstable and unbound nature of secretaries’
involvement in the final awards, this calls into question the true freedom of whose opinion guides

56

Legislative Decree No. 1071 (published in El Peruano, the official gazette, June 28, 2008).
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, C ASES AND M ATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND P RACTICE (5th ed. 2009).
58
Kyriaki Karadelis, The Role of the Tribunal Secretary, GLOBAL ARBITRATION R EVIEW (Dec. 21 2011),
www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30051/the-role-tribunal-secretary/.
59
ICSID NOTE.
57
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the procedures. 60 Party autonomy is at odds with any attempt to regulate secretary usage without
consent of the parties or their overriding authority. 61

2.

Secretary “Miscellaneous Services” Raises Brows

Duplicity or uninformed appointment occurs regularly in arbitral proceedings 62, acting as
the default where formal rules allow or are silent. Current efforts attempt to move away from the
current default and secret nature of using or appointing secretaries to having all peoples involved
in the arbitral proceedings assume a secretary will be used. 63 Parties then have the option of
addressing the use and terms of the secretary involvement at the front-tend of the proceedings.
Then, the unnecessary costs become more prominent when using a secretary hinges on the
explanation of her necessity.

C. Drafting the Office Boundaries

1.

Delegations

Normally, arbitral duties should not be delegated. 64 In the Note from the Secretariat of
the ICC Court Concerning Appointment of Administrative Secretaries by Arbitral Tribunals,
which provides that the work of any secretary (somewhat analogous to the clerk of an American
judge) "must be strictly limited to administrative tasks" and that the secretary "must not influence
in any manner whatsoever the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal." 65

2.

“4th Arbitrator” Perception

The crux of the controversy surrounding the secretary rests on how much influence the
position wields. Often deemed the “4th Arbitrator” 66, many worry through compiling resources,
handling sole documentation of proceedings, and sometimes drafting the award, the power the
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secretary holds includes the ability to decide the award herself because her notes are not always
subject to disclosure. 67

a.

Mechanistic v. Substantive Reasoning

The mechanistic role of the tribunal secretary ideal encompasses the same administrative
roles akin to the traditional secretary: filing, scheduling, documenting68. But it never is that
simple. Even drawing the distinction between mechanistic and substantive reasoning 69 is blurred.
For instance, if the secretary is documenting the minutes or record of the proceedings
unmonitored, or perhaps untrained in a court reporter capacity, how hidden is her opinion, her
agenda, her perceptions of the parties? While it is not impossible to provide impartial
documentation, these reports are not subject to authoritative review for veracity. 70 Even
unintentional opinions could flood the documents arbitrators will review before giving the award.
One arbitrator in attendance at the GAR conference, commented that the facts and arguments that
surface during proceedings are indispensible to identifying the reasoning behind an award71. If
the record truly is this imperative to the outcome, these common, and often background, practices
warrant structure and guidance.
Even more poignant is the practice of allowing secretaries to draft the arbitral awards.
One arbitrator who admitted to regularly endorsing awards written by secretaries defends the
practice as “reflecting a conversation”72 rather than an invitation for secretaries to give opinion:
In CIETAC practice, where there are three arbitrators, the presiding
arbitrator will take a principal role in driving the issues through the
hearing. During or following the hearing, he or she will preside over an
internal meeting among the arbitrators and will discuss the open issues
involved. Where the arbitrators can reach an opinion, such opinion will
be noted by the secretary in charge of the case who attends the hearing
and the arbitrator's meeting throughout the process. In most cases, the
presiding arbitrator is under a general duty to prepare the draft Award
recording the opinion of the case, with the assistance of the handling
secretary of CIETAC secretariat. 73
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His position was one of transparency that secretaries are used throughout the
proceedings and deliberations with no extra charge to the parties. He views the role of arbitral
secretaries as a trade usage, necessary to maintain the current efficiency of arbitral proceedings. 74
The general benefits of secretary involvement in the substantive reasoning portion of
arbitration proceedings go beyond diminishing costs and time and can include well-crafted
awards with little jeopardy of challenge. Secretaries can spend more time on researching and
drafting than arbitrators for the same fee to parties. 75 Also, rhetorical skills should be a
determining factor in appointing secretaries. This skill could prove indispensible if compared to
dismal, ambiguous, or incorrectly drafted awards produced by arbitrators.

D. Payment: It’s More Than Petty Cash
The final issue strays from the normal controversial issue path of proceedings and
highlights the clear lack of guidance concerning the practice of using secretaries: who pays for
this? 76

1.

Lower Rate Than Arbitrators

The popular conception is that the billing rate for arbitrators is vastly higher than the
hourly rate of secretaries who are qualified to do the more nominal tasks. 77 Under this theory,
even when the parties are not aware a secretary is involved, billing for secretary services is
appropriate because it saves the parties money:
Many arbitrators find it useful to appoint a secretary to the tribunal who
will carry out administrative functions on behalf of the tribunal and
render assistance to the tribunal before, during and after the hearing. In
heavy document cases, this is particularly useful because the secretary
can provide considerable assistance with regard to the collation of the
documents and save the time of the tribunal in finding documents at
any stage of the proceedings. Time spent by the secretary will be at a
lower charging rate than that of the tribunal. 78

2.

Ad Hoc v. Institutions

The distinction between ad hoc and institutional run proceedings also affects who pays
the secretaries. However, there is no common billing procedure among institutions: some keep
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secretaries on their payroll as part of their service 79; others appoint outside secretaries or allow
arbitrators to appoint outside secretaries 80, and parties are often billed for any services rendered.
Ad Hoc Arbitrations often lend themselves to more negotiated secretary fees because payment
procedures are not wrapped up in Institution Standards.81

3.

Inequality of Bargaining Power

Secretaries can create bias through more than simply drafting awards or recording
proceedings with their opinions. When arbitrators are given the discretion to appoint their own
secretaries, which is usually the case, they sometimes hire within their own firms or
organizations.82 In instances where the arbitrator who appoints the secretary was a party-chosen
arbitrator 83 the equality of proceedings shift significantly. Still, some situations create inequality
for both parties by allowing the arbitrators to empirically add costs from unbargained fee or wage
amounts without consent 84 or even disclosure.

IV. T H E A N S WE R K E Y

TO THE

FOLLY OF AMBIGUITIES: RECOMMENDATIONS

While it is undisputed arbitral institutions are attempting to address the problems apparent
the arbitral secretary relationship, the attempts thus far are failing because of the hesitancy to
regulate this practice. In order to maintain their competitive appeal, new regulations or provisions
set either vague limitations or include a savings-clause to protect their appeal. Basically, no one
wants to look like the jealous wife. In order to actually fix the issues, broad regulations are
unacceptable. Instead, the following is a list of proposed regulations and guidelines to achieve the
most optimal balance of party autonomy and fixed, predictable treatment of arbitral secretaries:

A. Statistics
One possible cause of creating the multitude of positions regarding secretaries lies in the
undocumented statistics. Most institutions do not keep statistics on the appointment of secretaries,
if party consent was given, who appointed the secretary, how the secretary was paid, if the award
challenged, etc. 85 Without clear proof favoring any one opinion of how the secretary should
function, the debate will not likely die after guidelines are implemented. Before Institutions do
implement regulations, data needs to be gathered from on going arbitrations.
79
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B.

Selection: Let the Wife Run the Hiring Process

Similar to the procedure of choosing arbitrators, the selection of the secretary or
secretaries should mirror party preferences and bargains. If only one secretary is needed, the rules
governing arbitrator neutrality also apply. Arbitrators should retain the right to recommend
secretaries with full disclosure of their relationship to better enable parties to make an informed
decision.

C. Appointment and Scope of Duties
Secretaries should not be the default assumption in arbitral proceedings. Instead,
arbitrators must (1) notify all parties of the need/desire for secretarial aid, (2) allow for party
designation of the secretaries, (3) have party consent before any appointment, (4) notify parties of
costs, and (5) allow parties to dictate the level of involvement. This last provision, (5), eliminates
the differing interpretations of what is clerical and what is analytical: parties establish a case-bycase designation of secretarial power. Commentators are divided on whether any actions beyond
administrative actions are appropriate 86 but under the scope of party autonomy this argument
vanishes. If leaving this decision to the parties seems an error or misguided given party lack of
concern or experience perhaps institutes should produce generic templates, similar to the current
practice of arbitral clauses, as a basis subject to mutual party modification87.

V. W I F E V . S E C R E T A R Y
A. Conclusion Immersed in Suspicious Minds
Ultimately, until the arbitration community produces a strong consensus on the tribunal
secretary’s defined role, full disclosure and cantor should guide current proceedings. When
friends and family solicit cautions and warnings not to trust her husband’s secretary (Jean
Harlow) in Wife v. Secretary, Linda (Myrna Loy) challenges the unconditional trust of her
marriage to Van (Clark Gable) 88. Similarly, no matter how tight an Institution might think it’s
guidelines to the scope of tribunal secretaries or how much contracting parties believe it rests on
party autonomy, once trust is called into question it is hard to mend. This mistrust of arbitration
proceedings could have a detrimental affect on this form of dispute resolution. Consequently,
arbitrators should learn from Gable’s mistake and always be forthright with the use and role of
their secretaries in order to maintain the sanctity of arbitration.
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